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HOW MANY LIBERTARIANS DOES IT TAKE 
TO FIX THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM? 
Thomas L. Greaney* 
MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? By 
Richard A. Epstein. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. 
1997. Pp. xvi, 503. $27.50. 
There's an old joke about a Southern preacher who is asked 
whether he believes in the sacrament of infant baptism. "Believe in 
it?" thunders the preacher. "Hell, son, I've seen it done." In Mortal 
Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care?, Richard Epstein1 
gives testimony that markets should be left unfett�red to distribute 
health care services. Arguing from first principles, he aims to per­
suade that the messy, confusing business of health care is best dealt 
with by simple legal rules: permit free contracting, countenance no 
government-induced subsidies, recognize no positive rights. One 
leaves this particular revival tent feeling he has heard a good ser­
mon on the wages of sin (failed government regulation), but has not 
been given much reason to believe in the preacher's promised land 
(libertarian capitalism). 
The book's skeptically phrased subtitle, "Our Inalienable Right 
to Health Care?" cleverly captures the two principle themes of the 
book. Used in a positive sense, as in the Declaration of Indepen­
dence, an "inalienable" right to health care connotes a fundamental 
right - an interpretation that might be derived from regarding 
health care as a prerequisite to the pursuit of happiness. From this, 
Epstein warns, it is "but a short leap to the proposition of universal 
access to health care" (p. xiv), which is the bete noire that he seeks 
to slay in the first half of the book. He marches the reader through 
the difficulties in limiting futile care, the problems of defining and 
providing necessary indigent care, the paradoxes of community rat­
ing and mandatory insurance, and finally the failure of two compre­
hensive access programs, Medicare and the proposed Clinton 
administration health reforms. The second meaning of "inaliena­
ble" is negative: legal rules impose restraints on alienation in 
health care by restricting freedom of contract in matters such as 
organ transplantation, euthanasia and assisted suicide, and tort lia-
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. B.A. 1970, Wesleyan; J.D. 
1973, Harvard. - Ed. I am indebted to Sandra Johnson for helpful and probing comments. 
1. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
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bility. The second half of the book investigates the law's pervasive 
interference with autonomy in health care matters from an individ­
ual rights perspective that Epstein asserts is "closer to the sense of 
the original Declaration of Independence than the modern gloss 
that has been placed on it" (p. xv). 
Why Epstein believes his two targets (government-sponsored 
access and legal restrictions on contracting) place us in "mortal 
peril," however, is less clear. True, a free market for organs might 
save lives by expanding the supply of a scarce resource. But eutha­
nasia, assisted suicide, and contracting for lower thresholds of tort 
liability? Though these practices might save resources, they might 
well increase the aggregate mortal peril of the citizenry. Likewise, 
removing entitlements to health care services hardly seems calcu­
lated to improve the nation's health. Wasteful as government enti­
tlements may be, their eradication can scarcely be said to avoid 
mortal peril for those who rely on them to obtain health services. 
Epstein's apparent answer lies in the alchemy of the market. Free 
markets improve the flow of resources and increase aggregate so­
cial welfare. Ultimately this rising tide will lift even the health care 
boat: "[T]he size of the resource base does more for the creation of 
good health than any political interventions designed to skew its 
use" (p. 219). I say apparent answer because Epstein is un­
characteristically vague about explaining just how things will work 
themselves out. And despite the asserted power of Epsteinian eco­
nomics, he looks to the deus ex machina of charitable care to assure 
adequate health to all. 
In this review, I argue that the history, economics, and politics 
of health markets belie Epstein's abstract reasoning. Though much 
of the argument in Mortal Peril is written in the language of eco­
nomics and cost-benefit analysis, Epstein's core faith is libertarian­
ism. I attempt to show below that he eschews careful analysis of the 
economic complexities of health care markets in favor of simple 
principles that focus almost entirely on autonomy. It should be un­
derstood, especially by policymakers, that the resulting harsh policy 
prescriptions are not compelled by economic reasoning but by a set 
of arbitrarily chosen first principles. 
Because of the constraints of time and my own predilection, this 
review focuses on the portions of the book of greatest importance 
to the health care reform debate that has been going on in Washing­
ton and most state capitals over the last five years. Part I discusses 
the principles and methodology Epstein brings to the task of ana­
lyzing health law and policy and Part II expressly takes up the au­
thor's challenge to test his analysis with empirical evidence. The 
remainder of the review focuses on the three principal market re­
form issues addressed in Mortal Peril: Part III takes on Epstein's 
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critique of programs providing care to the poor or cross-subsidizing 
such care; Part IV analyzes his approach to regulations affecting 
insurance and managed care; and Part V focuses on the discussion 
of Medicare and the Clinton administration's health reform 
proposals. 
I. METHODOLOGY AND .MEsSAGE 
Mortal Peril can be seen as Epstein's effort to deploy many of 
the themes and principles developed over an uncommonly prolific 
academic career to see how they might work in practice. His influ­
ential and widely discussed writings on takings, tort law, individual 
rights, and regulation form a body of scholarship that rivals Richard 
Posner's in sweep and renown among legal academics. An impor­
tant feature of his recent scholarship is an attempt to develop sim­
plified, common-law-based principles to address complex legal 
issues.2 Epstein is also justly acclaimed for his willingness to con­
front the most difficult challenges to his positions. In choosing to 
paint on the canvas of the health care sector, he has characteristi­
cally taken on a daunting challenge. Health care markets are noto­
rious for their peculiarity and complexity, as well as the emotional 
rhetoric they inspire. One would be hard pressed to think of an 
area less hospitable to consensus on simple solutions that rely on 
first principles. Epstein at least deserves credit for choosing to test 
drive his theories on such a difficult terrain. 
In the end, however, Mortal Peril does not meet this ambitious 
goal. Measured against his promise that the book's arguments are 
"not advanced as deductive certainties, but as empirical proposi­
tions, capable of being tested in particular contexts" (p. 20), Epstein 
utterly fails to meet his own standard of proof. Indeed, he hardly 
tries. Instead of marshaling evidence and proposing policies that 
would persuade the reader that simple rules based on first princi­
ples can and do work in health care, Epstein contents himself with 
tracing out the implications of his philosophy and selectively criti­
cizing deficiencies in existing regulation.3 Part II of this review 
2. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLES FOR A COMPLEX WoRLo (1995). 
Epstein identifies six basic rules: "self-ownership, or autonomy; first possession; voluntary 
exchange; protection against aggression; limited privilege for cases of necessity; and takings 
of property for public use on payment of just compensation." Id. at 53. He also suggests a 
somewhat qualified and orphaned seventh rule that if there is to be redistribution to the poor 
it must be financed by fiat taxes. See id. at 148. 
3. Similar problems plague Epstein's defense of his seven simple rules. Though asserting 
"the most powerful justification for the rule [of self-ownership] is empirical," he offers no 
such evidence. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 59; see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Book Note, Preach­
ing to the Choir, 105 YALE L.J. 1153, 1157-58 (1997) (reviewing EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLES FOR 
A CoMPLEX WoRLD (1995)) ("Rather than cite specific empirical evidence, Epstein analyzes 
the theoretical disadvantages of alternatives to self-ownership based on the assumption of 
rational maximizing behavior (pp. 55-58). On that basis, he concludes that his rule maximizes 
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takes up the author's challenge, offering some empirical observa­
tions that raise serious questions about the economic efficiency of 
the libertarian health care market Epstein envisions. Ultimately, 
Epstein comprehensively documents the failure of health law and 
policy to heed his advice, but neglects to offer convincing proof that 
society would be better off if that advice were followed. As the 
author acknowledges, in understatement, his book "is not rich in 
quick fixes for intractable problems" (p. xii). Indeed, one might go 
further: the reader is only given a glimpse of what the Epsteinian 
health market would look like. 
A second problem involves Epstein's methodological inconsis­
tencies. A social scientist would probably find it surprising that a 
law professor professing a strong kinship with economists and 
economics-oriented policy analysts would disregard their research 
in the health care field. The works of thoughtful health economists 
like Pauly, Fuchs, Dranove, Newhouse, and Reinhart are ignored 
and the voluminous health services literature is not consulted. 
Likewise, Epstein does not discuss the important writings on risk, 
preference shaping, and psychological analyses of market behavior. 
These omissions are particularly glaring because throughout Mortal 
Peril the author purports to champion a welfare-maximizing ap­
proach consistent with sound microeconomic principles. Indeed, 
notwithstanding Epstein's libertarian philosophy, his argument is 
distinctly deontological and utilitarian. Throughout Mortal Peril he 
deploys the language and methodology of economics and cost­
benefit analysis, principally to deride the current state of regulation 
in health care.4 Yet, as discussed in this review, he pays no atten­
tion to the subtleties and imperfections of the market that have 
caused even the most ardent market enthusiasts to endorse some 
forms of governmental intervention. 
Never far from the surface is the tension between Epstein's 
strongly held libertarian views, which reject most forms of state co­
ercion, and his invocation of economic/utilitarian modes of analysis, 
which sometimes require governmental meddling to assure efficient 
outcomes. The sources of this tension are several. First, as Martha 
Nussbaum has noted, the libertarian preference for liberty over 
efficiency and asserts that people would choose such a regime if placed behind 'a veil of 
ignorance' (pp. 57-58)."). 
4. For example, Epstein describes the role of law in fundamentally utilitarian terms ("The 
grand task for all legal and social institutions is to try to find some way to arrange for human 
affairs to secure the largest net benefit to the public at large," p. 417); faults proponents of 
laws mandating emergency treatments for not asking "whether over time [the laws] will in­
crease the number of lives saved, or more properly, raise them to a level that justifies the 
public expenditures," p. 104; criticizes laws promoting community rating as prohibiting the 
market from reaching a "stable equilibrium" and fostering inefficiency, pp. 121-31; and assails 
Medicare and the Clinton Health Security Acts for their "hidden subsidies and the massive 
dislocations they cause," p. 146. 
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other values is "on a collision course" with utilitarianism, which is 
at bottom committed to pursuing the greatest total (or average) 
utility.5 Infringements upon liberty and property may produce 
greater social welfare; categorically assuming that such infringe­
ments inexorably decrease utility is nothing more than a sleight of 
the invisible hand.6 Second, under Sen's paradox, libertarianism 
comes into inevitable conflict with utilitarianism employing the 
Pareto optimality criterion whenever one recognizes other-regard­
ing preferences. 7 Dismissing all such preferences cannot withstand 
close economic and efficiency scrutiny. Finally, adoption of a social 
welfare criterion that aggregates welfare across persons runs 
squarely into traditional libertarianism. Hence, Epstein's avowed 
acceptance of utilitarianism as the "justificatory apparatus for de­
marcating the scope of state power from the area of individual 
choice"8 is a move away from libertarian orthodoxy.9 However, as 
discussed below, this move may be a feint because Epstein's utilita­
rian analysis is skewed to yield libertarian outcomes. 
An example of how this tension between libertarianism and util­
itarianism plays out is found in Epstein's treatment of charity care. 
A critical juncture in utilitarian analysis is the choice of a measure 
of what law and policy should seek to maximize. Strict utilitarian­
ism seeks to maximize individuals' happiness by using some metric 
of utility. For many, including most economists, wealth maximiza­
tion supplies a convenient, albeit imperfect, proxy for utility. It is 
imperfect because it fails to account for differences in distributions 
of wealth and is particularly suspect, as Epstein admits, "when cer­
tain transactions do not get completed because the prospective 
buyer lacks necessary funds" (p. 34). Nonetheless, Posner and 
others rely on the impossibility of making interpersonal compari­
sons of utility as a grounds for sticking to the wealth maximization 
criterion.10 Epstein acknowledges that the "wedge between maxi­
mizing social wealth and maximizing utility" provides the strongest 
5. Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular 
Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. , REv. 1197, 1206-07 (1997). 
6. See id. at 1207 ("[l]f one tries dogmatically to rig things so that restrictions on liberty 
always result in more utility losses than gains, one is simply robbing the idea of utility­
maximizing of any predictive value."). 
7. See Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. PoL. EcoN. 152 (1970); 
see also Jason Scott Johnston, Not So Cold an Eye: Richard Posner's Pragmatism, 44 V AND. 
L. REv. 741, 750 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 
(1990)) (criticizing Epstein because he "misses the logical conflict between libertarianism and 
efficiency"). 
8. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 30. 
9. See Heidi Li Feldman, Libertarianism with a Twist, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1883, 1891 (1996) 
(reviewing EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A CoMPLEX WORLD (1995)); see also RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (4th ed. 1992) (distinguishing value and utility). 
10. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 13. 
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theoretical support to the claim for a right to health care (p. 31). By 
this he acknowledges that aggregate welfare-improving transactions 
may not occur when individuals are unable to afford to pay and that 
strict adherence to the wealth maximization norm would neglect 
these improvements. However theoretically or empirically valid 
this concern might be, the problems raised are "only instrumental 
and not moral" (p. 32) and can be tolerated because voluntary 
transactions in the form of charitable giving provide a more reliable 
means of making accurate interpersonal utility comparisons (pp. 35-
37). As to the argument advanced by some, including libertarians,11 
that charitable provision of health care is a public good that will be 
under-provided in the marketplace due to free-rider problems and 
related market imperfections, Epstein questions (without providing 
evidence or anecdote) whether such a problem exists. If it does, he 
would allow for state intervention only to the extent of subsidizing 
charity through tax incentives. Here, libertarian principles trump 
despite the purported commitment to a social welfare standard de­
scribed above. A utilitarian examination of the costs and benefits 
of the alternatives may well reveal that market imperfections are 
significant and that tax policy is an inefficient means of correcting 
market failure. 
II. WILL LAISSEZ-FAIRE POLICIES PRODUCE EFFICIENT HEALTH 
CARE MARKETS?: SOME EMPIRICAL COUNTERPOINTS 
The competitive revolution in health care is approximately 
twenty years old - an ample period within which to gauge its per­
formance.12 While market forces have undoubtedly fostered cost 
savings and efficiency-enhancing improvements, there is abundant 
evidence suggesting that health care markets perform less optimally 
than others. Those who would resist regulatory efforts to improve 
competition in the health care sector (or would withdraw from gov­
ernment all regulatory functions) might be expected to address 
these documented failures of the private market. Astonishingly, 
Epstein says almost nothing about how the competitive market in 
health care has developed so far. The following empirical observa­
tions underscore the point that persistent market imperfections un-
11. See, e.g., Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to A Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 
PHIL. & Pua. A.FF. 55, 68-72 (1984). 
12. Passage of the HMO Act during the Nixon administration in 1975 signaled Congress's 
active encouragement of competition in the health care sector and began a series of steps that 
ultimately undermined various legal and professional norms that supported a professional 
paradigm in health care delivery and financing. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 
1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(e)-(e)(9) (1994). See Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm 
of Medical Care: Obstacle to Decentralization, 30 JuRIMETRICS J. 415, 416 n.2 (1990) (identi­
fying 1979 as a "the watershed year" for acceptance of competition in health care when Con­
gress rejected the Carter administration's proposal to regulate hospital rates and encouraged 
competition in health·care in amendments to federal health planning legislation). 
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dermine the efficient functioning of health care markets. Together 
they support the contention that government intervention to pro­
mote an infrastructure conducive to competition could produce su­
perior econ�mic outcomes.13 
Fraud, Abuse, and Waste 
The health care sector countenances enormous losses due to 
fraud, waste, and abuse in paying for provider services that are un­
necessary, fraudulently billed, or otherwise improperly provided. 
By some accounts, fraud and abuse contribute ten percent or eighty 
billion dollars to �nnual health care spending.14 While much of the 
looting unquestionably can be traced to the door of governmental 
programs that lack competitive rigor and arguably are not well­
monitored, the problem is shared by payers in the highly competi­
tive private sector.15 Indeed, the practice of provider "self refer­
rals," which studies indicate raised costs of care, was tolerated for 
many years until federal enforcement stepped in.16 The magnitude 
and persistence of these practices lend support to the argument that 
health care markets are uniquely plagued by informational deficits 
owing to the nature of health care services and the reliance of both 
patients and payers on provider judgments. 
Demographics and Local Market Structures 
Many parts of the country lack a population base sufficient to 
support workable competition, as envisioned by managed competi­
tion advocates. Demographic evidence suggests that as much as 
thirty or forty percent of the country resides in markets that have 
natural monopoly or natural oligopoly characteristics because fewer 
than three integrated systems are likely to form at efficiently con­
figured network levels.17 Antitrust law, which intervenes to pro-
13. The themes set forth in this section update and confirm views expressed ten years ago 
about the need for regulation to permit effective competition. See Thomas L. Greaney, 
Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 179 
(1988). 
14. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and 
Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 488, 
489 tbl.2 (1994). 
15. See id. (discussing prevalence and estimates of straightforward fraud and abuse); Kurt 
Eichenwald, Unwitting Doctors and Patients Exploited in a Vast Billing Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 6, 1998, at Al (citing estimates of more than one billion dollars in losses by private 
health insurance companies from false claims). 
16. See RICHARD P. KussEROW, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FINANCIAL 
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: REPORT TO CON­
GRESS 18 (1989) (documenting higher incidence of treatment for patients referred to clinical 
laboratories in which referring physician had investment interest). 
17. See Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform - The 
Demographic Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 148, 150 (1993). 
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hibit inefficient consolidations or private agreements, has little to 
say about markets that are structurally uncompetitive owing to 
scale economies.18 Conventional economic theory posits that regu­
latory interventions are appropriate unless the threat of entry 
makes such markets perform competitively. A further consequence 
of unconstrained market forces may be to permit consolidations 
and closings of facilities in rural markets so that residents will be 
deprived of adequate access to health care. Whether these 
problems call for regulatory interventions to control price, en­
courage development of buyer cooperatives large enough to impose 
"yardstick" pricing on rural markets, subsidize rural health care 
services, or establish other mechanisms is open to question. Never­
theless, the data indicate that an unchecked market may produce 
results that are economically inefficient or unacceptable to 
policymakers.19 
Adverse Selection and Risk Adjustment 
It has long been recognized that health insurance markets are 
particularly vulnerable to adverse selection, which ultimately inter­
feres with the market obtaining equilibrium.20 The strong tendency 
of adverse selection to affect the behavior of health insurers is 
driven in part by the skewed distribution of health expenditures in 
the United States. One percent of the population accounts for 
thirty percent of all health spending while fifty percent of the popu­
lation account for only one percent of health spending.21 Adverse 
selection causes many distortions in health care markets: it deters 
small business from offering insurance, discourages an efficient of­
fering of certain kinds of coverage (for example, mental health 
services), and has fostered many ill-advised government corrective 
measures such as mandated benefits and other insurance laws.22 
Selection problems might be dealt with in the market by buyers' 
developing counter-measures. However, the evidence suggests that 
employers offering multiple plans rarely risk-adjust for enrollees' 
health characteristics. In the absence of such adjusted payments, 
18. See Michael S. Jacobs, Rural Health Care and State Antitrust Refonn, 47 MERCER L. 
REv. 1045, 1060-61 (1996). 
19. See Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and 
Antitrust, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1507, 1521 (1994). 
20. See CoNGRESSIONAL REs. SERV., lOlsr CONG., lsr SESs., INSURING THE UNINSURED: 
OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS (Comm. Print 1988); WHITE HousE TASK FORCE ON HEALTH RISK 
POOLING, HEALTH RISK POOLING FOR SMALL-GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE 15-16 (1993); 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, 90 Q.J. 
ECON. 629 (1976). 
21. See M.L. Berk & A.C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Expenditures: An 
Update, HEALTH A.FF., Wmter 1992, at 145, 146. 
22. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Economists, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Health Care Reform, 
HEALTH A.FF., Spring 1995, at 182, 184. 
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plans have strong incentives to engage in "cherry picking." More­
over, the phenomenon may create disincentives to compete on 
quality because, perversely, having a good reputation for quality 
can lead to unfavorable selection. Difficulties in developing ade­
quate mechanisms for risk adjustment have plagued Medicare and 
private insurance pools seeking to reduce adverse selection.23 
Variations in Medical Practice, Outcomes Research 
. Numerous studies have documented that wide variations exist 
among providers in the nature and intensities of treatments and 
that these differences in medical interventions cannot be explained 
by scientific evidence.24 Likewise, it is widely recognized that the 
medical profession lacks a,dequate outcomes research to assist con­
sumers and insurers in selecting providers or pay plans based on 
demonstrable evidence of quality and cost effectiveness. As a re­
sult, though there has been vigorous competition among plans 
based on price and nonprice variables (for example, choice of phy­
sician, style of care, and breadth of network), there is very little 
evidence of rivalry based on outcomes or quality of care indica­
tors.25 Economic analysis, of course, stresses the importance of the 
production of information as a prerequisite to effective competi­
tion.26 Experience suggests that transaction cost and public good 
problems may prevent the market from producing optimal levels of 
information. 
Employers as Imperfect Agents 
, As a result of tax policies and historical developments, the em­
ployment relationship dominates the choice of health plans: nearly 
three-fourths of privately insured consumers buy health insurance 
through their employers. In theory, this relationship might improve 
the functioning of the market by counteracting information deficits. 
23. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Patients at Risk: Health Reform and Risk Adjustment, 
HEALTH A.FF., Spring 1994, at 132, 139 ("[T]he good news . . .  is that there is a substantial 
literature on risk adjustment. The bad news is that the literature could be summarized as: 
We don't know how to do it very well despite several years of trying."). 
24. See THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES (John E. 
Wennberg & Megan McAndrew Cooper eds., 1996); John Wennberg, Dealing with Medical 
Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, HEALTH A.FF., Summer 1984, at 6. 
25. See Robert H. Miller, Competition in the Health Care System: Good News and Bad 
News, HEALTH A.FF., Summer 1996, at 107, 117. 
26. See Mark V. Pauly, The Public Policy Implications of Using Outcome Statistics, 58 
BROOK. L. REv. 35, 50 (1992) ("The ideal of competition involves much more than multiple 
producers of care trying to attract patients. Decades of evidence proves that competition 
alone, in the face of distorted incentives and imperfect information, will not produce an out­
come that will make people happy. The ideal of a competitive market, as outlined by 
Enthoven, involves more than just many sellers. Such a market also involves knowledgeable 
buyers facing proper financial incentives." (citation omitted)). 
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Employers might act as savvy purchasers, gathering information 
and negotiating insurance contracts on behalf of employees. How­
ever, dependence on employers for purchasing insurance has pro­
duced highly idiosyncratic results. B oth the choices and 
affordability of insurance vary significantly among employers. 
Large employers almost uniformly offer health insurance to em­
ployees; more than half of small employers do not.27 Eighty per­
cent of small employers offer only one health plan to their 
employees,28 and these employees pay higher co-pays and deduct­
ibles and a higher percentage of premiums than employees of larger 
firms.29 Contrary to the managed care model for competition, few 
small employers have joined small business purchasing coalitions.30 
Finally, employer-dominated coverage has created certain well­
recognized problems: distortion of individuals' choices in the labor 
market and "job lock," that is, creating artificial incentives for peo­
ple to stay in their jobs because of fear losing of health insurance 
coverage.31 
Individuals as Informed Purchasers 
Competition-based reforms that require consumers to partici­
pate in care-limiting decisions under the shadow of financial incen­
tives implicitly assume that consumers are capable of making 
rational decisions. Studies indicate, however, that individuals are 
- perhaps inevitably - poorly equipped to be informed consum­
ers of health care. They lack medical training to evaluate the need 
for alternative courses of treatments; they do not have adequate 
data to weigh the costs and benefits of care; and they are unlikely to 
act as rational, detached consumers at the time of illness.32 The 
results of the well-known RAND Health Insurance Experiment, 
which closely examined the behavior of patients with insurance cov­
erage requiring cost-sharing, suggest, for example, that patients are 
27. See Paul B. Ginsburg et al., Tracking Small-Firm Coverage, 1989-1996, HEALTH AFF., 
Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 167, 168 (stating that 99% of firms with more than 200 employees offered 
health benefits to employees in 1996 compared to only 49% of smaller firms). 
28. See Jon R. Gabel et al., Small Employers and their Health Benefits, 1988-1996: An 
Awkward Adolescence; Limited Choice and High Out-of-pocket Costs for Employees May 
Help to Explain the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 103, 105. 
29. See id. at 107-08. 
30. See Miller, supra note 25, at 118. 
31. Though the recently enacted Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ad­
dresses the problems of portability and renewability of private insurance, the legislative rem­
edy is of limited scope. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAw: CASES, MATERIALS, 
AND PROBLEMS 824-34 {3d ed. 1997). 
32. For an excellent elaboration of this argument and summary of the literature on pa­
tient spending decisions, see MAruc A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE 
LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 43-50 (1997); see sources cited 
infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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unable to make medically sound decisions as to whether to seek 
treatment.33 Other studies question whether consumers can or will 
choose providers based on quality preferences even when inf orma­
tion is available. One notable study suggests that even those pa­
tients most expected to engage in quality-based searches in 
choosing providers rarely do so.34 The ability of consumers or their 
employers to monitor effectively the quality of health care services 
is open to serious question.3s 
Recent Legislative Reform 
Health care reform did not end with the defeat of the Clinton 
administration's proposal in 1994. State legislatures have adopted a 
large number of statutes regulating managed care organizations;36 
insuring portability and placing restrictions on variations and in­
creases in premium rates;37 restricting the use of genetic informa­
tion in health insurance;38 and improving the market for small­
group insurance by promoting health purchasing cooperatives, im­
posing risk adjustment mechanisms and instituting other reforms.39 
33. See HALL, supra note 32, at 49 (RAND study confirms that "patients are both not 
capable of making good individual treatments on their own and that they rely heavily on 
their physicians' reco=endations even when they are paying out of pocket"); JosEPH NEW­
HOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RA.ND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 
{1993). On the broad implications of the RAND study for demand theory in health services, 
see Thomas Rice, An Alternative Framework for Evaluating Welfare Losses in the Health 
Care Market, 11 J. HEALTH EcoN. 85 (1992); see also Feldman & Dowd, What Does the 
Demand Curve for Medical Care Measure?, 12 J. HEALTH EcoN. 193 (1993); Martin Gaynor 
& William B. Vogt, What Does Economics Have to Say About Health Policy Anyway? A 
Comment and Correction on Evans and Rice, 22 J. HEALTH PoL. POLY. & L. 475, 485-86 
(1998) (critical responses); see generally Kathleen Lohr et al., Effect of Cost-sharing on Use of 
Medically Effective and Less Effective Care, 24 MEo. CARE S-31 (1986) (in Supplement: Use 
of Medical Care in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment: Diagnosis- and Service-Specific 
Analyses in a Randomized Controlled Trial). 
34. See T.J. Hoerger & Howard, Search Behavior and Choice of Physician in the Market 
for Prenatal Care, 33 MEo. CARE 332 {1995). 
35. See Tunothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Manage­
ment, or the Market?, 31 Aruz. L. REv. 825, 855 (1995) ("[I]t takes a mighty leap of faith to 
believe that consumers will in fact choose the plan or institution that is in some absolute 
sense either the highest quality or the most appropriate for their needs."); Haya R. Rubin, 
Can Patients Evaluate the Quality of Hospital Care?, 41 MEo. CARE REv. 267 (1990). 
36. Forty states have passed a variety of such laws, including statutes requiring managed 
care plans to provide information to emollees and prospective members; setting standards 
for mandatory length of stays for maternity care; regulating utilization review criteria; ensur­
ing access to emergency care; mandating provision of direct access to obstetricians/gynecolo­
gists. See Surveys and Studies: Managed Care, 14 Health Care Poly. Rep. (BNA) 568 (Apr. 7, 
1997). 
37. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION: VARIATION 
IN STATE SMALL EMPLOYER HEALTH INsuRANCE REFORMS, GAO/HEHS-95-161 FS, at 20 
(1995). 
38. See John Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 311, 330-31 
(1997). 
39. See MARK A. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INsuRANcE 3 (1994); Linda J. 
Blumberg & Len M. Nichols, First, Do No Harm: Developing Health Insurance Market Re-
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At the federal level, the Health Insurance Portability and Account­
ability Act of 199640 imposed rules assuring greater portability of 
insurance and requiring guaranteed issue or renewal of insurancein 
certain circumstances. Congress also greatly expanded health in­
surance for children by adopting the Children's Health Insurance 
Program,41 which will provide up to $24 billion over four years in 
federal funds to assist state programs to insure ten million chil­
dren.42 These laws evidence a strong endorsement of cross­
subsidies and assured availability of health insurance. This collec­
tive preference, expressed through the political process, provides· a 
powerful counterfactual to Epstein's contention that society prefers 
an atomized casualty model of health insurance (pp. 124-25). 
The foregoing paints a picture of a market beset with problems 
of inadequate information and imperfect agency. As a result, con­
sumers of health care are in many respects flying blind with respect 
to the quality of what they are purchasing and often lack the oppor­
tunity to make significant choices because of various structural or 
other impediments in the marketplace. Meanwhile, forces are at 
work that encourage insurance market participants to avoid risks, 
thereby segmenting the market in a way that disfavors the un­
healthy, or those with large transactions costs. While intermediat­
ing agencies such as certifying agents, boards of standards, group 
purchasing coalitions, and the like may develop naturally in the 
marketplace, the evidence suggests that they are slow to appear ori 
the scene. In addition, the recent torrent of legislation regulating 
health insurance and delivery markets suggests a social preference 
for market alternatives that embody cross-subsidies of various kinds 
and guaranteed availability of affordable insurance for consumers. 
Though these points offer only a snapshot of the issues complicating 
the performance of health care markets, the message should be 
clear: stripping government of any role in regulating health mar­
kets is unlikely to produce more efficient outcomes or satisfy socie­
tal preferences. 
Ill RATIONING AND SCARCITY 
Epstein's inquiry into the problem of access to health care (or 
positive rights, as he frames the issue) begins in the right place. 
"Legal entitlements must be geared for a world of scarcity, that is, 
fonn Packages, HEALTH A.FF., Fall 1996, at 35, 38 (describing various insurance market 
reforms). 
40. Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ 701-707, 2711-2713, 2741-2747, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939-55, 1962-
67, 2741-47. 
41. State Children's Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397aa-1397jj (West Supp. 
1997). 
42. See Hilary Stout, Children's Health Program is an Unlikely Survivor, WALL ST. J., 
July 30, 1997, at A6. 
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for a world where some legitimate wants have to remain unsatis­
fied" (p. 44). Unqualified claims to a right to health care will ulti­
mately impinge on other "legitimate wants," so it is incumbent 
upon rights advocates to come up with some limiting principles. 
Scholars and regulators have undeniably struggled in attempting to 
devise a workable definition and regulatory scheme that would 
cabin rights to a "decent minimum" of health care.43 It bears em­
phasizing - as Epstein certainly does - that any policy promising 
a�cess to health care need� to deal with a host of controversy-laden 
questions: What care is to be provided?' To whom? Who will ra­
tion care? And subject to what procedures and standards? 
Epstein himself need not answer any of these questions, how­
ever, for his vision is of a society in which price rations health care 
jµst as it does most goods and services. Those unable or unwilling 
to pay will either do without or - if they are lucky - find help 
through private charities. In the long run, all citizens will benefit 
from the larger economic pie and the proper alignment of 
incentives. 
For those who do not happen to inhabit the long run, however, 
the picture is considerably bleaker. As Uwe Reinhardt bluntly put 
it, "[Epstein's] argument seems to be that poor children in one gen­
eration can properly be left to suffer, so that all children of future 
generations may be made better off than they otherwise would have 
been."44 More about the implications of the libertarian prescription 
later. This section first analyzes Epstein's treatment of the problem 
of access to care, finding that his account of contemporary positive 
rights to health care is flawed descriptively and conceptually. 
Epstein identifies positive rights to health care in a variety of 
legal settings: government financing programs like Medicare and 
Medicaid; common law decisions that require "hospitals to provide 
emergency care to indigent patients; federal laws requiring that hos­
pitals provide certain care to all individuals as a condition of partici­
pation in the Medicare program; and various statutes governing 
private insurance that foster cross-subsidies. His broad critique of 
positive rights, however, does not fit all these cases. Providing 
health care services to the poor, for example, scarcely resembles the 
open-ended right to care that Epstein decries. In this regard, he 
seems bent on equating all health entitlements to the open check­
book that the Medicare program arguably provides. But such is as­
suredly not the case with respect to indigent care, which is provided 
43. See 1 PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. FOR TiiE STUDY OF EnncAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & 
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: A REPORT 
ON TiiE EnnCAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERV­
ICES {1983). 
44. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Wanted: A Clearly Articulated Social Ethic for American Health 
Care, 278 JAMA 1446, 1447 {1997). 
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through public health programs and Medicaid. These programs 
have long distinguished among the needy by various categories -
specifically favoring women with children, children, the disabled, 
and the elderly. Nor do the other means of providing health care to 
the poor - emergency care at hospitals, free care in clinics, and 
charitable care from private physicians - constitute an open-ended 
entitlement. The poor receive only sixty percent of the services of 
comparable insured citizens.45 Further, even those legally entitled 
to parity with the private sector find their care rationed: studies 
show that Medicaid beneficiaries receive fewer services, have less 
access to physicians, and are subject to considerably more delay and 
inconvenience than the insured population.46 Far from ignoring the 
problem of scarcity, then, American policymakers have summoned 
the political courage to ration health care to the poor. 
Epstein next embarks on a muddled and confusing argument 
contending that the problem of medical futility illustrates how "the 
theory of positive rights runs awry" (p. 81). End-of-life situations 
pose intractable problems because of the uncertainty in identifying 
situations of futility and in securing legal enforcement of rules re­
quiring cessation of treatment (pp. 69-71). In these circumstances, 
the problems of demanded care arise: individuals who can obtain 
care at other people's expense often do so and impose severe costs 
on the public sector. Yet Epstein goes on to acknowledge that all 
measures for dealing with the problem are problematic. As a result 
of medical ethics, human nature, humanitarian impulses, and the 
uncertain state of science, the available solutions - advance direc­
tives, contracting, and global budgets - are of questionable effi­
cacy in addressing the problem. Thus, instead of demonstrating 
that the regime of positive rights is to blame for demanded care, 
Epstein has shown that a web of other social and institutional cir­
cumstances contributes to the difficulty we have "saying no" in end­
of-life cases. Exploring on utilitarian grounds the competing merits 
of rationing through consumer choice, bureaucratic mechanisms, 
and physician direction would seem to be a necessary predicate to 
reaching conclusions about the proper scope of positive rights in 
these circumstances. What we are given instead is an account that 
decries government's unwillingness to confront the scarcity prob­
lem, but that affords no new insights as to how society should per­
form the rationing that scarcity analysis mandates.47 
45. See id. at 1446. 
46. See id. 
47. An extraordinarily thorough and thoughtful examination of these issues may be 
found in a recent book by Mark Hall. See HALL, supra note 32, at 43-50; see also Gail 
Agrawal, Chicago Hope Meets the Chicago School, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1793 (1998) (reviewing 
HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS). 
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Dumping on EMTALA 
Concluding his analysis of scarcity and indigent care, Epstein 
homes in on the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA),48 which he regards as a particularly good example of 
the pitfalls of governmental policies that create a positive right to 
health care. EMTALA obligates hospitals that accept Medicare or 
Medicaid and operate emergency rooms to screen (examine) all 
persons presenting in the emergency room and to provide treat­
ment sufficient to stabilize those patients who are in labor or in an 
emergency condition. Hospitals must provide these services to all 
comers regardless of ability to pay. The right created by EMTALA 
is positive, but limited: EMTALA does not prohibit transfers after 
stabilization and permits hospitals to divert individuals coming to 
their emergency qepartment.49 For Epstein, EMTALA is "an insti­
tutional mistake whose intended benefits are more than offset by its 
hidden costs" (p. 94). Among the hidden costs are closing and 
downsizing of emergency rooms; excessive demand and long 
queues for service; disincentives for new firms to enter the emer­
gency services market; increased risky behavior due to moral haz­
ard; and unequal burdens across hospitals. This is one of the few 
instances in which the author delves into the empirical and policy 
studies of health markets and thus his treatment merits closer 
analysis. 
The thrust . of Epstein's argument is that EMTALA has 
prompted closings of trauma and emergency centers where they are 
most needed and has interfered with the ability of managers of hos­
pitals to triage patients efficiently and perhaps save. lives in the long 
run. There may ,be a kernel of truth to this argument, but it is 
hardly established by the sources cited. Moreover, the author's fail­
ure to place EMTALA in context with other laws and develop­
ments in the health care industry leads him to draw overblown 
conclusions that conveniently suit his preference for autonomy. 
First, Epstein relies almost exclusively on a 1991 General Ac­
counting Office study that documents the closure of trauma centers 
owing to financial losses.50 While this study does note the phenom-
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West 1992). 
49. See Johnson v. University of Chicago Hosps., 982 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1993) (per 
curiam) (diverting ambulances via telemetry does not violate EMTALA). 
50. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, TRAUMA CARE: LIFE SAVING SYSTEM 
THREATENED BY UNREIMBURSED Cosrs AND OTHER FACTORS, GAO/HRD-91-57 (1991). 
Epstein also offers some anecdotal evidence about the University of Chicago's \vithdrawal 
from a cooperative protocol with other hospitals for directing emergency care, but that expe­
rience is unpersuasive particularly in view of the fact that its emergency room did not close 
and is still subject to EMTALA. See Troyen A. Brennan, Moral Imperatives Versus Market 
Solutions: Is Health Care a Right?, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 345, 355 (1998) (reviewing MORTAL 
PERIL). 
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enon, it does not attribute the closings to EMTALA in the simpli­
fied, post hoc ergo propter hoc fashion that Epstein does. Indeed, 
. empirical evidence recently gathered by Troyen Brennan indicates, 
contrary to Epstein's causal model, that hospital closures correlate 
positively with the absence of emergency departments.st The rea­
sons that not-for-profit hospitals shift away from the unprofitable 
business of emergency care are certainly economic, but they are 
also multifaceted. As a general matter, the pressures of managed 
care and tightened provider payments from Medicare and Medicaid 
have significantly shrunk the margins hospitals formerly used to 
cross-subsidize charity care.s2 Moreover, the unquestioned over­
supply of acute care hospital capacity has spurred downsizings, re­
organizations, and closures of many hospitals. HMOs and other 
managed care entities have placed strong pressures on providers 
and patients to reduce overutilization of inpatient facilities and par­
ticularly to curb unnecessary use of the emergency room.s3 Physi­
cians and hospitals have responded by altering patterns of care and 
establishing stand-alone care centers and other means of substitut­
ing for treatment in an emergency room. Nor does the presence of 
an emergency room work exclusively to the hospitals' detriment. In 
some instances, managed care entities have accused hospitals of 
taking advantage of their emergency facilities by over-treating and 
over-admitting privately insured patients.s4 Further, other factors 
su�h as increased liability risks for malpractice and regulatory pres­
sures may have contributed to hospitals' unwillingness to continue 
to operate emergency rooins.ss Thus the impulse to close emer­
gency units or reduce indigent patient care is a systemic issue, and 
not traceable to EMTALA alone. 
Finally, hospitals' obligations to provide free care arise from a 
variety of sources: state laws requiring emergency treatment or 
open access, tax-exempt status, community pressures, and charter 
obligations, to mention a few. The extent to which EMTALA's re­
quirements of screening and stabilizing patients create significant 
additional obligations is far from clear. Moreover, EMTALA can 
be seen as effectively reinforcing other public policies, like the char­
itable obligations of tax-exempt institutions, that may not otherwise 
be efficiently policed. 
51. See Brennan, supra note 50, at 354 n.10. 
52. See Erik J. Olson, Note, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency 
Room, 46 STAN. L. REv. 449, 468-70 (1994). 
53. See Diane Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care - A Dangerous 
Combination, 72 WASH. L. REv. 315 (1997). 
54. See Loren A. Johnson "& Robert W. Derlet, Conflicts Between Managed Care 
Organizations and Emergency Departments in California, 164 W. J. MED. 137 (1996). 
55. See Mark Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 38 JuruMETRICS J. 
389, 393-94 (1998). 
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Epstein also argues that EMTALA increases demand for emer­
gency room. .services. One hardly knows whether to take. seriously 
his claim that EMTALA gives rise to a serious moral hazard prob­
lem - that is, it encourages risky activities that individuals would 
otherwise not undertake. The bulk of behaviors that produce true 
emergencies requiring emergency room services - automobile ac­
cidents, gunshots, and labor and delivery complications - are 
hardly the kind of activities involving much deliberation. Positing 
that individuals undertaking such risky behavior are influenced by 
the availability of health insurance is, well, absurd. Epstein takes 
the point even further: Hospitals should be left unfettered in order­
ing the affairs of their emergency departments, even to the extent of 
refusing care because· of the self-inflicted nature of an illness.56 
Epstein's defense of such denials on utilitarian grounds rings 
hollow. Can one. really expect that triage determinations made in 
emergency departments will effectively balance the costs and bene­
fits of individual treatment? Is it not more likely that moral judg­
ments about drugs Qr sexual orientation or other factors such as 
race or class will predominate? 
Make no mistake. EMTALA is a poorly drafted, band-aid stat­
ute that has undoubtedly produced unintended consequences.57 
But it does respond to the well-documented58 problem of finan­
cially motivated, health-threatening transfers - a phenomenon 
that Epstein does not refute. Indeed, today's competitive environ­
ment is undeniably more prone to patient dumping than the situa­
tion that prevailed at the time of the enactment of EMTALA. 
Simple Rules, Preposterous Prescriptions 
Ultimately Epstein argues against the government's assuring 
any minimum level of health care. Indeed, he would reject most 
transfers to supply indigent care, including seemingly high benefit/ 
56. Epstein pulls no punches on this issue and apparently would grant hospitals wide 
discretion in choosing their emergency care patients: 
Unfortunately the current law makes it impossible for a hospital to treat drug addicts or 
alcoholics just once, or even twice, with this stem warning: there is no treatment next 
time, period - no matter what their personal consequences, including death. To the 
question, "you cannot let them die, can you?" we have to avoid the reflexive answer, no. 
To restore long-term stability to the system of emergency care, the answer has to be 
"yes, we can sometimes." 
P. 103. 
57. See Hoffmann, supra note 53; David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA: 
Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 29 (1998); Lawrence E. Singer, Look What 
They've Done to My Law, Ma: COBRA's Implosion, 33 Hous. L. REv. 113, 117-18 (1996); 
Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act: Denial 
of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives, 67 NoTRE DAME L. 
REv. 1121 (1992). 
58. See Robert L. Schiff et al., Transfers to Public Hospitals, 314 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 552, 
552 (1986). 
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low cost programs such as the recently enacted expansion of Medi­
caid to cover poor children.59 Though ostensibly relying on a utili­
tarian balancing of alternative means of satisfying social needs,60 his 
account is singularly unpersuasive and lacking even the gloss of an­
ecdote, let alone an empirical basis. Ultimately his position must be 
understood as resting on a libertarian preference for avoiding gov­
ernment coercion rather than on any careful assessment of impact 
on social welfare. 
Epstein begins by taking on the common perception that society 
would realize a gain in net utility by redistributing some modest 
quantum of health services to the poor. Repeating the familiar ra­
tionale that comparisons of utility are "conceptually impossible," he 
asserts that "[t]o make utility the coin of the political realm is to 
invite piteous tales of woe, exaggerated for the partisan purpose for 
which they are made" (p. 35). This position is vastly overstated. 
Herbert Hovenkamp has persuasively argued that it is possible to 
make objective welfare judgments that do not require highly indi­
viduated comparisons of utility. One may assume realistically that 
similarities among individuals occur over a small range of their util­
ity functions, particularly those that involve primary goods.61 Ob­
jective welfare judgments are commonplace in economics and in 
law and economics and they certainly drive the judgments of policy­
makers and social scientists. 62 
In any event, Epstein goes on to acknowledge that it is precisely 
the ability to make interpersonal utility comparisons that drives 
charitable giving, not to mention many other exchanges in every­
day life. While accepting the notion that individuals perform utility 
59. Arguing against expanding Medicaid to cover ten million children, Epstein wrote in a 
letter to the New York Tlilles: 
[E]xpanding subsidized care will drive private insurers from the market, thereby turning 
a larger fraction of working citizens into wards of the state . . .  [T]he new plan introduces 
large deadweight administrative costs, invites the overuse of medical care and reduces 
parental incentives to prevent accident or illness. 
By providing free public care, we further undercut charitable institutions and blunt 
efforts to slim down the vast licensing and regulatory apparatus that makes medical care 
unaffordable to so many. Mrs. Clinton's implicit premise is that Federal subsidies can 
offset Federal regulation. Mine is that we could do better with less regulation and less 
subsidy. Scarcity matters, even in health care. 
Richard A. Epstein, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, at 14. 
60. See id. 
61. 
[O]bjective welfare criteria can be used to make judgments that for most people the 
marginal utility of food or housing is greater, up to some point, than the marginal utility 
of jewelry or fast cars. Most people value such primary goods more highly, until they are 
supplied in some minimum sufficient quantity, than they value other goods further up 
the chain. 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 4, 78 
(1994). 
62. See id. at 81-83 (describing use of objective welfare judgments in economics and in 
law and economics). 
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comparisons when making charitable donations, Epstein argues 
that this does not open the barn door for permitting the govern­
ment to make similar determinations. He contends that the state is 
poorly equipped to make reliable comparisons for other people be­
cause of "[i]ts lumbering structure," "bureaucratic incentives," and 
the influence of "fierce and partisan politics" (p. 37). Moreover, 
charitable arrangements permit donors to "compare their own wel­
fare with the welfare of unidentified strangers in need and to re­
solve their internal conflicts against some narrow conception of 
their own economic self-interest" (p. 36). Hence, some form of ob­
jective welfare comparison is indeed possible and probably done in 
a manner quite similar to that proposed above. The key difference 
lies in Epstein's unwillingness to substitute assessments of aggre­
gate utility of citizens for individualized assessments by donors. At 
bottom, this position flows more from the author's antipathy to co­
ercion than from a comparison of the efficiency of the two alterna­
tives, for Epstein makes no attempt to evaluate the merits of the 
two institutions in this respect. There are certainly many efficiency 
questions that can be raised about the mechanics of private charity. 
For example, how effectively can donors monitor and police chari­
ties to overcome information, collective action, and monitoring 
problems? The notorious and scandalous conduct of directors and 
managers of not-for-profit hospitals and Blue Cross plans in recent 
years should surely give pause to anyone asserting that the not-for­
profit sector is an efficient substitute for government.63 
One of the more surprising aspects of Mortal Peril is that the 
author does not attempt to defend systematically his contention 
that charity will emerge to at least alleviate the suffering that would 
be caused by the wholesale elimination of government-supplied 
care and subsidies. For example, he offers no support for the im­
plicit contention that charitable impulse is thwarted or suppressed 
by the existence of large government programs. Is one to believe 
that potential suppliers of charity care are fooled into thinking that 
Medicare and Medicaid satisfy all the needs of the poor? Likewise, 
there is no attempt to give assurance that society can realistically 
count on new charitable sources to supply indigent care in the stag­
gering amounts required even partially to replace government pro­
grams. There is ample basis for skepticism: government program 
outlays for Medicaid alone in fiscal year 1996 totaled $160 billion,64 
63. See Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal 
Response to Hospitals' Changes in Charitable Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 231-32 (1997). 
64. See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Fmancing Administration, 
HCFA Statistics: Expenditures (visited June 2, 1998) <http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/hstats96/ 
blustat2.htm>. 
1844 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1825 
while aggregate charitable giving in the United States was only $150 
billion.65 
IV. INSURANCE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Epstein's concept of private health insurance is a bold one. 
That is a polite way of saying that his model of insurance would be 
totally unrecognizable to the vast majority of consumers and policy­
makers in this (or any other) country. Of course, Epstein's self­
described "contrarian" thinking should not disqualify his ideas from 
serious consideration; perhaps he has unearthed a better way to or­
ganize the market for private health insurance. Unfortunately, he 
has not. This Part argues that Epstein's analysis is fatally flawed by 
its inattention to the economics of health insurance. Because his 
vision is strongly refracted by a libertarian lens, he ignores the im­
perfections that plague the market for health insurance. Conse­
quently, his account cannot be said to offer greater market 
efficiency, however that term is defined. Moreover, the libertarian 
focus presumes an atomistic conception of insurance that is at odds 
with the prevailing societal conception of that product, expressed in 
numerous legislative choices. Changing that conception is certainly 
possible, but why should we assume that a market exists for a prod­
uct that the American society has collectively rejected? 
Epstein's approach dichotomizes broadly between casualty in­
surance, in which each person's premium is calibrated as closely as 
possible to the individual risk she transfers to the carrier, and social 
insurance, in which government interventions of various kinds en­
hance risk redistribution. Laws supporting community rating, 
prohibiting genetic discrimination, or barring pre-existing condi­
tions terms in insurance contracts are unacceptable to Epstein for 
their redistributional tendencies. In addition, Epstein argues that 
efforts to promote broader . risk sharing or risk redistribution 
destabilize markets as insurers vie for better risk pools. "Correct 
risk classification allows the insurance market to reach a stable 
equilibrium" (p. 121), while interference with that process blocks 
efficient resource allocation. 
Note that this account does not recognize the pooling function 
of insurance. Pooling entails spreading variations in medical spend­
ing across a group. To be sure, cross-subsidies occur in heterogene­
ous groups as premiums paid by those with better-than-average 
risks help cover the costs of those with worse-than-average risks. 
Low-risk individuals accept this arrangement because they want to 
be able to enjoy the benefits of pooling when they become worse-
65. See Adam Bryant, Companies Oppose Idea of Disclosing Charitable Giving, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at Al. 
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than-average risks, as most people do over their lifetime. Unfortu­
nately, market forces attack pooling as insurers that have strong 
financial incentives seek out better risks.66 The consequence of this 
process, called risk segmentation, is that high-risk individuals find 
insurance unavailable or prohibitively expensive.67 Likewise, the 
benefits to low-risk individuals may prove to be short-lived, as ag­
ing and unexpected illness (their own or that of members of their 
families) turn the tables on them.68 The market might be expected 
to solve this problem through multi-year or lifetime insurance con­
tracts. No such contracts exist, however, probably owing in part to 
the risks of adverse selection and other market imperfections.69 Ul­
timately policymakers confront a trade-off between risk segmenta­
tion and risk pooling. Unfortunately, economics cannot answer the 
question of which imposes higher social costs. Proponents of insur­
ance market reform point out, however, that reducing risk segmen­
tation comes at a relatively small cost and that the advantages of 
assurances of affordable insurance over time suggest broad popular 
support for such implicit taxes.10 
Insurance law and policy in the United States, consisting of legal 
interpretations, legislation, and administrative rulings, have never 
been guided by a single overriding principle. Economic, distribu­
tional, and equitable goals have all influenced the nature of insur­
ance products.71 There is no question, of course, about the fact that 
economic goals have been predominant. Indeed, many legal inter­
ventions seek to assure that the market can function properly, such 
as by dealing with transactions costs, adverse selection, and infor­
mation gaps.72 Other regulations are designed to redistribute risk 
and have the effect of sacrificing efficiency for the sake of redistrib­
uting wealth. Thus, · 1aws regulating community rating promote 
redistributional ends, _ while others, such as those governing sol-
66. See Alan C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Market-Based Reform: What to Regulate and 
By Whom, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 105, 107. 
-
67. Considerations of justice and social cohesion, not addressed in this review, are also 
raised by risk segmentation. See, e.g., Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health 
Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH PoL PoLY. & L. 285, 290 (1993) ("Actuarial fairness - each person 
paying for his own risk - is . . .  a method of organizing mutual aid by fragmenting communi­
ties into ever-smaller, more homogeneous groups and a method that leads ultimately to the 
destruction of mutual aid."). For an excellent analysis of Epstein's treatment of insurance 
regulation issues from a Rawlsian perspective, see Russell Korobkin, Determining Health 
Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance, ILL L. REv. (forthcoming 1998). 
68. See Linda J. Blumberg & Len M. Nichols, Health Insurance Market Reforms: What 
They Can and Cannot Do (visited May 8, 1998) <http:l/www.urban.org/pubs/hinsure/insure. 
htm>. 
69. See Blumberg & Nichols, supra note 39, at 38. 
70. See id. at 38-39. 
71. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RlsK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 9-10 (1986). 
72. See id. at 210. 
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vency and mandating simplicity in contracts, standardized benefits, 
and greater information for consumers help improve market effi­
ciency. The law governing health insurance has vacillated between 
encouraging greater pooling or sharing of risk and requiring a 
closer relation between health status and premiums. The trend in 
recent years has been unmistakably toward encouraging risk shar­
ing or pooling. 73 
My principal concern with Epstein's approach to regulation of 
insurance is his failure to acknowledge that some laws may improve 
the performance of health care markets. As noted above, control­
ling risk segmentation is at the heart of market reform efforts 
designed to improve efficiency.74 An enormous policy literature 
has developed concerning the steps necessary to avoid risk selec­
tion, to promote the gathering and use of information, and to pre­
vent abuses of market power. Although details and policy 
prescriptions vary, legislation to support risk pooling, minimize var­
iations in benefit packages, eliminate tax subsidies, promote joint 
purchasing of insurance, guarantee issue and renewal of policies, 
and implement other steps has been proposed by economists of all 
political stripes to deal with these issues.75 Finding the appropriate 
mix of policies is indeed a daunting challenge, but that does not 
excuse overlooking the complexities of the various proposals, as 
Epstein does. Simple solutions here are possible only if one 
chooses to define away the core economic problem. 
V. MEDICARE AND THE CLINTON HEALTH REFORMS 
Part I of Mortal Peril concludes with two extended chapters ana­
lyzing Medicare (unoriginally subtitled "The Third Rail of Ameri­
can Politics") and the Clinton administration's Health Security Act 
(HSA) (aptly subtitled "The Shipwreck"). For Epstein, these pro­
grams epitomize all that is bad in positive rights to health care: 
inefficiency, coercion, bureaucracy, unintended consequences, and 
73. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 311, 313-14 
(1997); see also supra notes 37-39. 
74. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTII CARE LAw AND PouCY: READINGS, NoTES, 
AND QUESTioNs 1108-10 (1988) ("Adverse selection is potentially the Achilles heel of a 
health policy relying on consumer choice . . . .  (but] an intensely practical problem that may 
be amenable to practical solutions."); Blumberg & Nichols, supra note 68; Alain C. 
Enthoven, Effective Management of Competition in the FEHBP, HEALTII AFF., Fall 1989, at 
33, 34 (discussing adverse selection under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program); 
Stanley B. Jones, Can Multiple Choice Be Managed to Constrain Health Care Costs?, HEALTII 
AFF., Fall 1989, at 51, 54. 
75. See, e.g., MARK V. PAULY ET AL., REsPONSIBLE NATIONAL HEALTII INSURANCE 
(1992); Stuart M. Butler, The Conservative Agenda, in THE PROBLEM THAT WoN'T Go 
AwAY: REFORMING U.S. HEALTII FINANCING 236 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1996); Paul M. 
Ellwood, "Responsible Choices": The Jackson Hole Group Plan for Health Reform, HEALTII 
AFF., Summer 1995, at 24, 25; Enthoven & Singer, supra note 66, at 105, 107. 
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excessive cost. His grasp of the mechanics and details of these com­
plex programs is impressive. His careful dissection of the fl.awed 
regulatory structures of each is a model of clear economic and pol­
icy analysis. The overarching message - that regulating price and 
quality in a complex industry like health care is a daunting, if not 
intractable, task for governments - is one that should be carefully 
observed by policymakers. Unfortunately, Epstein misses the fact 
that many of these same underlying conditions bedevil private mar­
kets and evidence the need for market-improving regulation. In 
many respects, the HSA, the rival bills before Congress in 1994, and 
many reforms subsequently considered by the states have been 
aimed at addressing those problems. As discussed below, these 
chapters also suffer from a number of problems that undermine the 
successful technical analysis of the programs. 
History, Politics, and Public Choice 
Epstein portrays Medicare as a program born in economic 
naYvete and inaccurate actuarial estimates, with every attempt to 
confine costs succumbing to incentives built into the program. The 
lesson? "[N]ever start down a road that promises to give subsidies; 
but once given, seek to limit them if possible" (p. 182). Epstein's 
historical account is seriously deficient and his prescription slights 
the program's purposes and achievements. First, Epstein does not 
acknowledge that Medicare's original sin - a cost-based provider 
reimbursement system only loosely policed by private in­
termediaries - was the product of explicit lobbying and coercion 
by the provider community.76 The perverse incentives that fueled 
Medicare's spiraling costs might just as easily be laid at the door of 
interest group politics as at the door of positive rights. Epstein's 
response appears to be that positive rights have inherently expan­
sionist tendencies. But is this true? It can hardly be argued that 
positive rights to public education, public housing, and food stamps 
have produced a spiraling growth in those entitlements. One might 
well look to the marriage of middle class entitlements and non­
market payments to providers for a more satisfying explanation of 
Medicare's unbridled growth. 
Second, Epstein's utilitarian account is completely one-sided in 
that it does not mention important items on the benefit side of the 
cost-benefit ledger. It entirely neglects the fact, for example, that 
Medicare was designed to reduce poverty among the elderly, and 
that it has been highly successful in this regard.77 Moreover, there 
76. See THEODORE R. MARMoR, THE PoLrncs OF MEDICARE 70-73 {1973); Thomas L. 
Greaney, Transforming Medicare Through Physician Payment Reform: An Introduction to 
the Symposium, 34 ST. LoUis U. LJ. 749, 750-54 {1990). 
77. See Bruce Vladeck, Medicare at 30, 274 JAMA 259 {1995). 
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is no mention of Medicare's important ancillary roles - namely, 
providing enormous subsidies to medical education and scientific 
research.78 Here one again finds Epstein's libertarian preferences 
dressed up as utilitarian analysis. In one astonishing passage, for 
example, Epstein criticizes judicial decisions upholding Medicare's 
freezes on prices paid to physicians based on the fact that physician 
participation in the program is voluntary: "Claims of physician vol­
untariness myopically ignore the system of taxes and subsidies that 
make the government the sole primary provider of medical services 
to persons over age 65 and to disabled persons" (p. 90). Appar­
ently, the six billion dollars in federal funds flowing in the other 
direction - subsidizing physicians' education - eluded Epstein's 
clear-eyed calculus. 
Epstein also offers a selective reading of the history and politics 
of the HSA. He correctly identifies a number of factors that under­
mined public support: the Clinton administration's "[g]affes and in­
trigues" (p. 192), including its propensity to promise everything to 
everyone; the plan's complexity; and its disguised but pervasive reg­
ulatory apparatus. But he goes on to draw some perplexing and 
unsupported conclusions about the causes of the plan's demise. 
The HSA "could have done little to improve the lot of the unin­
sured" (p. 215); it lost support because it "operated as a wealth 
transfer from the low-risk uninsureds to the high-risk uninsureds" 
(p. 197); it was the victim of having "oversold equality" (p. 199); 
and it ultimately fell victim to its "egalitarian impulse" (p. 215). 
The influence of massive lobbying and campaign contributions by 
special interests is only obliquely acknowledged: "The special in­
terests did line up against the plan, and for once they represented 
just about everyone" (p. 215). 
The extensive postmortem literature on the HSA identifies sev­
eral factors of greater importance than those Epstein highlights. 
Prominent among the concerns of the public and politicians were 
the plan's potential cost, the prospect of the rationing of health 
care, and the possibility that the plan might interfere with patients' 
choice of providers.79 Moreover, studies indicate that public sup­
port for universal access to insurance and reform of insurance mar­
kets remained strong despite the defeat of HSA.80 The torrent of 
legislation regulating insurance and managed care and expanding 
access to health insurance underscores the point that, if any collec­
tive preference was expressed in 1994, it was assuredly not what 
78. See id. 
79. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, BEGINNINGS COUNT: THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE IN 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 152-53 (1997); Robert J. Blendon, What Happened to Americans' 
Support for the Clinton Health Plan?, HEALTH A.FF., Summer 1995, at 7, 11; James Fallows, A 
Triumph of Misinformation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 26, 1995, at 26. 
80. See, e.g., Blendon, supra note 79, at 20-21. 
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Epstein suggests. His conclusion that the episode is a shining exam­
ple of the democratic process correctly rejecting subsidies and posi­
tive rights seems more like wishful thinking than the product of a 
careful evaluation of the evidence. 
What Is to Be Done? 
Mortal Peril offers no more concrete analysis of what to do with 
Medicare or managed care regulation than it does for indigent care 
programs like Medicaid. At one point Epstein suggests that medi­
cal savings accounts might be a move in the right direction but that 
"the present set of feeble alternatives [increased deductibles and 
copayments; increased choice of plan; reduced coverage for hospital 
stays] may be the best that can be enacted" (p. 182). In fact, with 
the adoption of Medicare+Choice in the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997, Congress took a definitive step toward bringing Medicare into 
the mainstream of managed care. 1bis move, bolder than anything 
proposed in the Clinton reforms, suggests that the supposed inevita­
bility of fixed or expanding entitlements is incorrect. 
While Epstein fails to offer programmatic solutions to problems, 
there is no shortage of broad-brush assertions about the fundamen­
tal principles that should apply. One such principle is the rather 
protean concept of generational equity. Epstein recounts, for ex­
ample, an episode in which he was asked to participate in a panel of 
scholars and experts on a television program concerning the Clin­
ton Health Reform proposal. 
[A]n earnest University of Chicago undergraduate . . .  had the temer­
ity to ask . . .  why he should have to fund the health insurance costs of 
his grandparents' generation. A representative of the AARP fum­
bled with a reply that stated in essence that in the long run the student 
would benefit from the same system that imposed this short-term dis­
location. Consistent with the norms of so much social accounting, no 
present-value calculations of benefits and cost were offered. It hardly 
mattered that the over-65 generation were large net recipients, and 
the under-25 generation large net payers. [p. x] 
Net recipients? Net payers? Of what? Epstein seems suddenly to 
suffer from tunnel vision when advocating inter-generational eq­
uity. Consider what a principled and beady-eyed utilitarian's 
calculus would look like. Surely it would include the present value 
of the costs incurred by the grandparents' generation in preserving 
the free market. Therefore it would take into account the lost lives 
and forgone income during World War II and perhaps the taxes 
spent on military expenditures during the Cold War. What of the 
tax-subsidized education and health benefits the undergraduate's 
generation has received? And the public expenditures through 
Medicare and other programs on medical education, research, and 
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public health that have produced an uncommonly healthy (albeit 
ungrateful) under-twenty-five generation? 
Equally unsatisfying is the book's treatment of managed care. 
In Epstein's view, most regulation of managed care is a bad idea, 
but his discussion of these issues never confronts those reforms 
aimed at improving competition and correcting market imperfec­
tions. Though the regulatory issues surrounding provider con­
tracting and insurance are among the most important and difficult 
economic problems faced by policymakers today, Epstein treats the 
subject as an afterthought. In a Postscript, Epstein sketches the pit­
falls of regulatory developments such as "any willing provider" 
laws, which ensure doctors' ability to offer services within a plan as 
long as they agree to the plan's terms and conditions, and efforts to 
regulate HMOs. After correctly identifying the capacity of these 
laws to undermine the potential benefits of managed care, Epstein 
fails to draw any connection with the vested provider interests that 
drive many reforms that are misleadingly billed as "consumer pro­
tection" measures.81 Moreover, many of the landmarks that com­
plicate the issue of regulation in the area are never addressed: 
• The Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA),82 which pre­
vents states from regulating self-insured employers, is perhaps the 
most important regulatory complication facing lawmakers. 
• The $100 billioµ. federal tax subsidy for private health insurance (a 
sum greater than the cost of providing coverage for every uninsured 
person in the country)83 distorts economic incentives, regressively 
allocates tax burdens, and encourages inefficient insurance purchas­
ing decisions. 84 
• Employer sponsored insurance, encouraged by tax laws and other 
regulations, distorts employment market decisions and creates 
other inefficiencies for certain purchasers of health insurance.85 
If Epstein endorses legislative repeal of these complications, he 
should say so and address whatever dislocations that repeal may 
cause. However, back-benching on managed care regulation with­
out acknowledging the current regulatory context makes for shoddy 
policy analysis. 
81. See Peter T. Kilborn, Bills Regulating Managed Care Benefit Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 16, 1998, at Al. 
82. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001-lOOlb (West Supp. 1998). 
83. See Reinhardt, supra note 44, at 1447. 
84. See SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 80-81 
(1997). 
85. See Michael J. Graetz, Universal Health Coverage Without an Employer Mandate, 
DOMESTIC AFF., Wmter, 1993-94, at 83. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mortal Peril teaches us several lessons. First principles yield few 
concrete policies. Those policies that do emerge from Epstein's 
first principles would leave tens of millions more citizens without 
insurance or health care, may permit insurance markets to unravel, 
and would block efforts to improve competition. Libertarians' in­
sistence on autonomy will thwart effective market regulation that 
could produce more efficient economic outcomes. Simple rules are 
not costless: complex problems may require nuanced solutions. 
Courageous as it may seem to some to let people die, it may not be 
all that efficient. 
Epstein mentions on several occasions the profound influence 
that his father, a radiologist, had on his thinking about this subject. 
He learned valuable lessons about charitable care, the perils of 
Medicare, and the fundamentals of medical ethics. I, too, learned 
some valuable lessons from my father, a shipyard worker who lost 
his pension and medical benefits - twice - when the shipyards in 
which he worked went out of business. Most, but not all, of his 
enormous end-of-life medical bills were paid for by Medicare. A 
big, good-natured Irishman, he never displayed any bitterness 
about his plight. But he did worry a lot about the bij.ls and at­
tempted to forgo expensive treatments whenever possible. Some 
costs are harder to measure than others. 
